1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:11-cv-10876-MLW
4	
5	BOSTON PRIVATE BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Plaintiff
6	Pidincill
7	VS.
8	
9	TODD RASSIGER and FIRST REPUBLIC BANK, Defendants
10	Detendants
11	* * * * * *
12	
13	For Hearing Before:
14	Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf
15	Motion for Droliminary Injunction
16	Motion for Preliminary Injunction
17	United States District Court
18	District of Massachusetts (Boston) One Courthouse Way
19	Boston, Massachusetts 02210 Wednesday, June 22, 2011
20	* * * * * *
21	* * * * * * *
22	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
24	One Courthouse Way, Room 5200, Boston, MA 02210 bulldog@richromanow.com
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    ALSO PRESENT: (Via telephone.) EDWARD DOBRANSKI, ESQ.
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PROCEEDINGS
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                (Begins, 10:30 a.m.)
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                THE CLERK: Case Number 11-10876, Boston
 4
     Private Bank & Trust versus Todd Rassiger, et al.
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     Court's in session. You may be seated.
                THE COURT: Good morning. Would counsel
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     please identify themselves for the Court and for the
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     record.
                MR. GLOVSKY: Good morning, your Honor.
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     Richard Glovsky for the plaintiff, Boston Private Bank.
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                MR. KURTZ: David Kurtz for the plaintiff,
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     Boston Private Bank.
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                MR. GLOVSKY: And, your Honor, with us is
     Megan Chambers who's General Counsel at the bank.
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                THE COURT: Thank you.
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                MR. BROOKS: Good morning, your Honor. Doug
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     Brooks for the defendant Todd Rassiger.
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                MR. COMMISSO: Good morning, your Honor, John
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     Commisso for Mr. Rassiger.
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                MR. GURYAN: Good morning, your Honor, Barry
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     Guryan for First Republic Bank.
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                MS. DEMPSEY: Good morning. Aime Dempsey for
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     First Republic Bank, admitted pro hac.
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                THE COURT: And who do we have on the
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     telephone?
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MR. GURYAN: Your Honor, we have Mr. Ed
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     Dobranski, who is the Vice-President and General Counsel
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 3
     of First Republic.
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                THE COURT: And, Mr. Dobranski, can you hear
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     us?
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                MR. DOBRANSKI: I can hear you fine. I can
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     hear you, your Honor, very well. The other guys are a
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     little bit muted.
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                THE COURT: Well, I will encourage them to
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     speak into the telephone.
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           And is from Rassiger here as ordered?
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                MR. BROOKS: He is, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Where is that?
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                MR. RASSIGER: Right here, your Honor.
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                THE COURT: All right.
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           There were some filing made yesterday,
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     supplemental status report for Mr. Rassiger and the
     plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction
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19
     with regard to First Republic.
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           Is there anything else that was recently filed
     that I should have received and read?
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                MR. BROOKS: No, your Honor.
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                MR. GLOVSKY: No, your Honor. Although we do
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     have additional affidavits should the Court inquire on
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     certain subjects today.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, First Republic, of course, hasn't had an opportunity to respond to the motion for a preliminary injunction directed to it, however, if a preliminary injunction issues against Mr. Rassiger, First Republic would be enjoined as a person acting in concert with Rassiger under Rule 65(d)(2)(C) in any event. So I think the focus will remain on the motion concerning Mr. Rassiger.

First Republic does have to respond to the complaint. I think it was filed about --

MR. GURYAN: Your Honor, it was filed June 3rd and an answer is due June 29th.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GURYAN: That was an amended complaint.

THE COURT: Correct. And I expect we'll be discussing scheduling after I resolve the preliminary injunction issue.

I'm well familiar with the submissions and I think it would be helpful, though, for me to get an update on your views on certain questions. The defendant contends that a preliminary injunction is not necessary. I'm interested in your respective views on that and on whether if I do proceed as I expect I will, Mr. Rassiger wants to testify. I'm certainly open minded but I'm skeptical about some of the

representations made in his declaration concerning his motives or state of mind when he took these many documents which are, at the moment, appear to me to include trade secrets.

I'm interested in knowing, if I do issue a preliminary injunction, what it should enjoin. I'm interested in knowing what the remaining discovery dispute would be to be resolved if the preliminary injunction issues or perhaps if it doesn't. I might employ the magistrate judge for that. And I'm interested in knowing who the clients A and B are and why their names shouldn't be in the record. They're obviously going to be witnesses in this case. And if there is a reason to keep their identity out of the public record, it needs to be part of the record, I think, in some fashion.

But, Mr. Glovsky, do you want to start by addressing those preliminary issues.

MR. GLOVSKY: Certainly, your Honor. I think it's very clear, your Honor, that Mr. Rassiger, um, committed a theft here and that he knowingly did so. And ever since he committed that theft -- and I think that when you're referring to Mr. Brown's affidavit, it appears that he did so on at least six dates, nine different times. So -- and even he acknowledges, your

Honor, that he did take material that perhaps he shouldn't have taken. And the reason that we particularly need the injunction is because he, and I would submit the bank, the First Republic Bank, too, have proven, in the short duration of this case, that they cannot be trusted with the documentation that Mr. Rassiger took from Boston Private Bank.

Among other things your Honor, um, we have recently learned that Mr. Rassiger wiped clean two of the flash drives onto which he downloaded information, obviously transferring them someplace else in attempting to hide his theft.

Also, you may recall that in his affidavit that he submitted in his declaration he said he had the three flash drives. Well, it turned out -- and we said he had four. It turned out he did have four. And after we attempted to engage in trying to ascertain what, in fact, he had taken and after representatives from my firm and the bank's expert, as well as Mr. Rassiger, spent quite a bit of time at his home one night making copies, which we haven't yet seen, which I can explain to the Court in a minute, but making copies of his personal computers, low and behold a few days later we got a note from counsel telling us, "Oh, we found another flash drive onto which he downloaded" --

THE COURT: And was that after you had told them that you believed that there were four, not three?

MR. GLOVSKY: That's correct. So there's no reason -- and there are many other reasons that I think are fairly pronounced in what we presented to the Court to suggest that neither Mr. Rassiger nor his new employer can be trusted with anything other than an injunction.

THE COURT: All right, that flushes out what I inferred would be your concern and the essence of your argument. Mr. Brooks?

MR. GLOVSKY: And I would also mention, your Honor, that there is -- in the information he took there's a great deal of personal information, data about clients, individuals, all of which is extraordinarily sensitive. So there's a public interest involved here, too.

MR. BROOKS: Just to address those issues, your Honor. We've also looked at these flash drives and our experts, after a preliminary review anyway, don't find any evidence that these were wiped clean. And I'm not sure what that refers to, your Honor, but that's not the report we got. We did get a letter late last night from them saying they found that -- I'm a lay person obviously but I understand that sometimes on preliminary

reviews that can show up and it turns out that's not the case, so we do not agree with that, your Honor.

In terms of the flash drives, it's a little hard for me to say because I came in late in the day, but this is the first I've heard that they said there was a missing flash drive. Mr. Rassiger found a flash drive on his own and gave it to them. So I'm not sure how that can possibly be evidence of bad faith. They didn't know about this. He said, "I found it here. Copy this one as well."

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm prepared essentially to decide the motion for a preliminary injunction on the record as it exists, but, I'm sorry, Go ahead. We do have another party.

MR. GURYAN: Yes, please, your Honor.

I just wanted to point out that on July 3rd, as you know, the complaint was amended to add the bank, First Republic, and after 18 days, yesterday they decided to make a motion for a preliminary injunction against the bank. In fact, if you look at the affidavit that's attached to Mr. Rassiger's declaration from Katherine August-deWilde, she says specifically that their bank didn't use the information, they didn't rely on the information, they didn't get any --

THE COURT: I think it says the opposite, it

says that she got information about the interest rates 1 from both Mr. Rassiger and the clients, A and B. 2 3 MR. GURYAN: I'm sorry. With respect to the 4 clients, it's clear that Client A approached 5 Mr. Rassiger after he came to First Republic and --THE COURT: What makes that clear to me, that 6 7 Mr. Rassiger told me in his affidavit? 8 MR. GURYAN: There's no evidence that --THE COURT: I know, but this is on a 9 10 preliminary injunction. I'm sitting here with 11 substantial evidence that Mr. Rassiger is a thief. 12 Look, I'm happy to hear from him, but I'm not 13 considering the motion for a preliminary injunction with 14 regard to the bank which is on the conversion theory 15 that hasn't been briefed by anybody. 16 MR. GURYAN: Well, I --17 THE COURT: Let me finish. You're going to do 18 better if you listen to me. 19 However, the bank hired Mr. Rassiger. 20 would, in the ordinary course, be covered as a person acting in concert with him if I enjoin him, and that's 21 22 the way it's going to work. And it's very important --23 I think somebody could have got here from San Francisco 24 by now and I realize, because I've just finished a 25 7-week trial and started focusing on this more

yesterday, that you didn't have that much notice. So it's fine. But the bank's a party and the bank is a person acting in concert with Mr. Rassiger anyway, so I'm going to focus on the Rassiger matter and we'll go from there.

MR. GURYAN: I just wanted to say for the record that there are no facts, it's all speculation against the bank.

THE COURT: Mr. Rassiger is the bank. He was their employee. If he misused the trade secrets, he was acting on behalf of the bank.

MR. GURYAN: Your Honor, there's no evidence that he misused it and there is evidence that he received -- that Ms. DeWilde received this information and undercut, made a low-ball offer to get the business. There's no evidence they relied on any of this information.

And I also would say that the injunction that was proposed -- even though it just came in yesterday, is incredibly broad.

I wanted to get to. I want to understand at the beginning the scope of the injunction I'm being asked to issue. However -- however, um, Mr. Brooks, I'm not persuaded that the issue is moot, although it would

permit me to get back to other things, if I was, and I've told you I'm skeptical, for reasons I'm going to describe, but I'm going to listen to your argument about Mr. Rassiger's written explanation as to how what appeared to me to be trade secrets, you know, came into his possession. I don't know whether you're requesting that he get a chance to testify in view of that skepticism. Of course, if he testifies, his testimony has to be truthful.

MR. BROOKS: No, your Honor, we weren't planning to have him testify and he's here because of the order.

THE COURT: Yes, and I may want to hear from him depending on how the argument evolves, but I understand you're not asking and, at the moment, it's my present intention to decide the matter based on the written submissions, which are thoughtful and thorough.

What is -- Mr. Glovsky, what is the scope of the injunction you're now -- the preliminary injunction that you're now seeking?

MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, your Honor. Preliminarily what we want to make sure occurs or does not occur is that any information that Mr. Rassiger obtained from the bank is not utilized, is not disseminated, and ultimately -- and your Honor may feel at this point

maybe this isn't the Court's decision -- it's not the time for the Court to make this decision, but that ultimately that it be expunged, returned and otherwise there would be no trace left either in Mr. Rassiger's possession or in First Republic's possession of any of this information that he took.

but -- and to the extent there are trade secrets, I think it's First Republic's position that it hasn't used them and it doesn't intend to use them, and it might be prudent for them just to expunge it and satisfy you they expunged it and that would materially reduce the risk that they'll get embroiled in litigation about whether they've been in contempt of any injunction, if I issue one.

But, I mean, I thought that part of what you want is -- in the preliminary injunction, is an order restraining the defendants or anybody acting in concert with them from deleting any electronic files or destroying any documents that came from Boston Private Bank. Is that part of it?

MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you're seeking the return of documents and information that you say are trade secrets. I guess I'd have to consider whether that's

appropriate on a preliminary injunction. You wanted originally a designated forensic computer expert to have access to all the flash drives used to download. Has that already occurred?

MR. GLOVSKY: At this point, based on representations of counsel, without having examined Mr. Rassiger under oath in a deposition, um, our understanding is, yes, we have the four flash drives and we have reviewed them and preliminary reports include, as I mentioned, the fact that apparently two of them have been wiped.

THE COURT: And you're asking for access to Mr. Rassiger's personal computers and e-mail accounts by your expert. Has that occurred?

MR. GLOVSKY: That has not occurred. What has occurred is there has been an imaging of them, but we couldn't seem to break the logjam over our review of what was imaged. So at the moment there is a code that prevents us from reviewing them. Mr. Kurtz has been more involved in that part of the case than I have, your Honor, and he can explain some of the technicalities relating to that, but the bottom line is that the protocol that's been offered to us to review them we feel is inadequate because it would allow Mr. Rassiger to continue to conceal documents that he took from the

bank. 1 2 THE COURT: All right, so that's still a live 3 issue. 4 MR. GLOVSKY: That is still a live issue. 5 THE COURT: You want an accounting of the 6 information and documents obtained, is that correct, you 7 still want that? MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, please. 8 THE COURT: And what is it -- what is it --9 10 what, in addition, are you seeking in the motion that 11 you filed yesterday concerning First Republic? 12 MR. GLOVSKY: Well, essentially the same 13 relief from First Republic, your Honor, so that this 14 information is, at the very least, safeguarded and not 15 disseminated until the Court gets to the merits of the 16 case. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 And, Mr. Brooks, how do you perceive the discovery issues or the parameters of the injunction? I mean, 19 20 there are two questions, one, whether there should be a 21 preliminary injunction or not, and you say, "Well, we've 22 agreed to it, so there's no need for an injunction," and 23 open to considering all of this, but what about the

scope of -- because I just haven't seen a written

agreement signed by the parties, for example.

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MR. BROOKS: Well, do you want me to for now leave aside the argument why I don't think a preliminary injunction is --

THE COURT: Yes, I'm just trying to figure out what's in dispute substantively.

MR. BROOKS: Well, as I see it, in terms of an order that he not use or disclose any of the Boston Private information or that he not destroy it, um, we've agreed to that -- first of all, destroying it he obviously couldn't do under the rules of spoliation.

Not using it, we've agreed that --

THE COURT: Also, under the laws that prevent -- all right. Go ahead. Go ahead.

MR. BROOKS: And we've made representations, if that's the case, we've offered, you know, to enter into a stipulation and file it with the Court. So that's not -- in terms of the scope, that's not an issue.

The accounting, I think the tough part with that is we just need some clarification because one thing that Mr. Rassiger has been, um, very careful about doing is not -- you know, making sure not to look at anything that could be on his personal computers related to Boston Private, which he would need to do to make an accounting. I'm not really sure if -- I mean, they know

exactly -- as I understand from the papers their forensic review is an accounting. So I won't object to that in principle, I just think that it causes problems and that you would have to review those at this time and I don't think they want that.

In terms of the issue about purging things, again it's a little mutually exclusive with making sure that he doesn't destroy anything, we had offered -- we, being Mr. Rassiger's former counsel, before he got involved, initially to destroy everything so that he couldn't have access to it and Boston Private took the position, which I understand, that, "No, no, no, that would be spoliation," so we didn't do that.

I think the real issue, your Honor, is in terms of what to do with the mirror images of Mr. Rassiger's computers and then the analogous issue of what to do with his personal e-mail accounts. And in terms of the personal computers, we have -- we've issued -- we submitted a forensic review protocol, which is attached to our supplemental status report. Your Honor, I could try to explain it in lay terms about what -- about basically what we're operating?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROOKS: Just quickly. There are these mirror images and what we've said is -- we've invited

Boston Private to, you know, give us search terms so we can search the computer for whatever -- give us whatever search terms you want that you think are going to be -- are going to pull up of relevant documents. In the first instance we will do -- our experts will do a search pulling out and get a list of all the documents that it pulls out. We will segregate any attorney-client privileged communications and any irrelevant personal documents, because these are family home computers.

What we will do then is then invite their experts into the second search, with those segregated, so they can see how the search went and they can see that they're getting all of these relevant documents. In the meantime in terms of the -- what we would think would be sort of false/positive hits, there would be two categories, attorney-client privileged communications and personal -- irrelevant and personal documents.

We'll log all of those. So we won't just make a privilege log, we will also update a log with sufficient detail of "Hey, here's why this document was hit on, but here's why it's not -- here's why it's personal," so that they could challenge that. And within that that's the lay explanation.

Apparently the experts -- there's all sorts of

ways to electronically tag these documents to satisfy the experts that they know exactly what is not being produced and that there would be no issue later about recreating the search to deal with what -- what we again we would deem as false positives.

The issue, your Honor, is -- as I read, the only proposal we have from them, I think, is their proposed order which would just give them access to the computer in the first instance. And I've looked, your Honor, and in terms of the case law, it appears what we're offering, especially at this stage, is far ahead of the curve and I would just --

THE COURT: Well, I'm actually -- I'm just trying to find out what's in dispute. As I said, if I issue the injunction and then there's a question where to go from there, then I may have the Magistrate Judge deal with that issue.

MR. BROOKS: Okay. Sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: No, this is very helpful. That's very responsive. I just want to make sure I understand the terms. A "mirror image" is what, a complete copy of the hard drive or the information on the computer?

MR. BROOKS: Yes, and so not just documents, but also all the relevant meta data. And the same -- the functional equivalent of a mirror image -- and I'm

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not sure if it's called a "mirror image" or not, of his
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     personal e-mail accounts -- because these are g-mail
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     accounts so they don't actually reside on the computer,
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     they reside in the clouds, as they say, that has been
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     copied in the same and the functional equivalent of
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     mirror image in --
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                THE COURT: And is there -- that all of the
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     discussion so far is focused on computerized records,
     which I understand can be printed out, but are there any
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     other documents about which the plaintiff is concerned?
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                MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, your Honor. Of course,
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     hardcopies may have been made of any of these documents.
                THE COURT: Yes, but other than the
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     hardcopies, are there any documents at issue that don't
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     come from computerized records that you know of?
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                MR. GLOVSKY: I don't believe so.
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                THE COURT: Okay. And --
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                MR. GLOVSKY: May I have a minute, your
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     Honor?
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                MR. BROOKS: Your Honor, I'm not sure if I was
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     clear --
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                THE COURT: Just hold on a second.
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                MR. BROOKS: Oh, I apologize.
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                (Pause.)
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MR. GLOVSKY: We don't know all that
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     Mr. Rassiger did. We know about 1500 documents that he
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     downloaded. So what we're looking for, your Honor, is
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     something that encompasses whatever it was he took in
     whatever form he took it.
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                THE COURT: Okay. And I think First Republic
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     expressed some concern about the scope of a possible
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     order?
                MR. GURYAN: Yes, your Honor. Let me just
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     make two points on that. And that is that --
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                MR. DOBRANSKI: Excuse me, your Honor. Could
     you ask Mr. Guryan to speak up?
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                THE COURT: Yeah, talk right into that
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     microphone. Your client wants to hear what you say.
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                MR. GURYAN: Yes, I'm away from the
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     microphone. Sorry. Can you hear me now?
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                THE COURT: Is that better?
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                MR. DOBRANSKI: Yes. Thank you.
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                MR. GURYAN: With respect to the order, your
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     Honor, it is very broad and covers public information,
     an example would be Paragraph Number 3, any information
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     that has to do with Boston Private. You can look on the
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     Internet and find information about Boston Private. All
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     that does is stifle competition and we think that's --
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                THE COURT: And that's valuable. But if I
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find that trade secrets were taken, I would probably issue an order that covered everything he took and if some of it's public, um, that would be unfortunate, but I don't know how at this point, um -- a preliminary injunction has to describe with specificity what is done and we're not going to do a document-by-document analysis of trade secrets. But actually it's -- I don't mean to discourage you from raising these things, it's very helpful, and there probably are ways that I could write it including, you know, that "You can't use any documents or information taken from, um, the plaintiff, but if the information is also available from public sources and is obtained from those sources, it's -- it can be used."

MR. GURYAN: My point, your Honor, was it's not limited to documents that were taken from Boston Private, it just said it's including documents, so it's broader.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GURYAN: The last point is of great concern to First Republic because what they're asking is that an expert of a competitor roam around First Republic's computers to see what it could find. Now, this is no different than a discovery request where you have a discovery and you develop a targeted approach.

And this is what we've been doing for the last threeplus weeks with our experts is trying to identify and
turn over everything we could. So this would simply be
a targeted approach much like what Mr. Brooks identified
as just an orderly way to -- either through search terms
or other terms that our experts can suggest and rely on
and so that a competitor is not just take a fishing
expedition.

THE COURT: All right. This is just what I was looking for.

And why should these customers be called "A" and "B"?

MR. GURYAN: Your Honor, from our standpoint, we didn't start that.

THE COURT: I know, that was really for Mr. Glovsky.

MR. GLOVSKY: Your Honor, just to protect their identity, these are private schools, and we did that because, you know, we thought there may be some sensitivity of them appearing in --

THE COURT: Well, this is a reason I think you ought to resolve the case. Any time there's litigation that puts clients there, you're not the only two lenders in the world and you run the risk of your clients playing on both of your houses. But I'll call them "A"

and "B" for today, but, you know, obviously they're going to be the subject of discovery if this case endures and there's no contention, I think, that they did anything wrong, so there has to be a reason to seal something and I don't see it at the moment. But that doesn't have to get resolved right this minute.

All right. Well --

MR. GLOVSKY: Your Honor, just to respond to one point Mr. Guryan made. There's been no proposal that I'm aware of insofar as First Republic's bank documents are concerned and obviously, I think to some extent, First Republic by its association with Mr. Rassiger and I think their knowledge of what he did —— and by the way your Honor should know that Mr. Rassiger, that there is yet another employee, Betsy Sullivan, who recently left the bank and went over to First Republic and also downloaded documentation onto two flash drives which we are now reviewing.

So there's a lot of culpability on the other side of this case, I would submit, and to some extent anyway I think they had forfeited, as a result of that culpability, some of the prerogatives that they might otherwise be entitled to.

THE COURT: All right. The -- let's get to the merits of this. If I don't issue an injunction, the

scope of it is moot.

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Well, it's my tentative view that an injunction is warranted. I perceive there's a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the misappropriation of trade secret and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The federal claim raises some issues but -- about what "exceeding the scope of authorized access" means, but I think the First Circuit, as opposed to perhaps the Ninth Circuit, seems to be going in the plaintiff's direction. I do think, at the moment, and this is all tentative, that there is a sufficient showing of irreparable harm. strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits diminishes the degree of irreparable harm or the strength of the showing of irreparable harm that needs to be demonstrated. But as a practical matter, in this case I don't think there would be an adequate remedy at law.

There are going to be contentions about whether it was public information or private information that was used and how to value the loss of goodwill that comes with confidential client files being taken. And I don't think there is at the moment, you know, genuine hardship to Boston Private Bank. I don't see the cognizable hardship to Mr. Rassiger or his employer at the moment if he's prohibited from using trade secrets and there's

certainly a public interest in not permitting stolen confidential information to be used for someone's competitive disadvantage.

And this is an equitable remedy, as I say, and I can get into the details, but Mr. Rassiger's explanation that he just took these things having a vague notion that it would be nice to have the forms or he took some pride of authorship doesn't ring true to me. Some of these things were Boston Private Bank's ratings of the clients, for example.

So that's my present state of mind. I'm leaning against the defendant. I feel like I'm fairly familiar if not familiar with the submissions.

Mr. Glovsky, I can let you go first or I can let Mr. Brooks go first and give you a chance to respond.

MR. GLOVSKY: I'm happy to allow Mr. Brooks to go first, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BROOKS: Thank you, your Honor, and I'll try to be brief.

THE COURT: You don't have to be brief. It's important. I've studied what's in there, but you know this much better.

MR. BROOKS: What I think is critically missing from their argument in their motion and

ultimately their claims is that they don't explain, much less provide any evidence, of how Mr. Rassiger's possession or more importantly his alleged use of any of this information caused them any harm. And this is not a case, your Honor, about a former employee stealing the secret recipe and going off and giving it to his new employer and it's also not a case about a salesperson, you know, taking a customer list of thousands of nameless customers and being able to then use that to compete. What this is a case about in their papers, your Honor, is two customers, two customers, both of whom were well-known to Mr. Rassiger, one who ended up switching banks based on more favorable interest rates and the other who stayed with Boston Private and got the more favorable interest rate.

Now, it's undisputed, if you look at the papers, that the customer's decisions in terms of the one that switched banks, it was all based on a lower interest rate. And Boston Private itself describes these interest rates as unusually low. So this is not -- and this is based on their papers, you don't have to take our word for it, but this is not a case where, based on the information that Mr. Rassiger took, he was able to make subtle undercuts of prices, which you see in a lot of these cases. They admit these were unusually low

interest rates. Nothing in these documents could have 1 2 provided any advantage to Mr. Rassiger. He knew these 3 4 THE COURT: Why -- I guess I have a couple of 5 questions. You know, why take them if they're useless, 6 (A) and (B) I mean one of the -- do I remember right 7 that part -- that some of the documents he took had 8 Boston Private Bank's ratings of the clients? MR. BROOKS: A couple of things. In terms of, 9 10 yes, there were ratings, this goes to a point you made 11 There were things such as ratings and I think 12 your Honor questioned, understandably, "Well, how does that fit into this kind of vague notion of using them 13 14 as" -- We're not talking about documents that there was 15 just a rating document, what this was was sort of an 16 untargeted approach in terms of Mr. Rassiger taking a 17 document because it had, for instance, some form 18 language and because he wasn't giving it a lot of 19 thought though --20 THE COURT: If you want me to rely on that contention, then Mr. Rassiger's going to go on the 21 witness stand and be cross-examined. 22 23 MR. BROOKS: I understand. 24 THE COURT: I know it's hard, you know, to

make -- it's not the best way to make credibility

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judgments on a paper record. I'm offering him the opportunity and Mr. Glovsky or somebody can cross-examine him and I might even have a question for him.

But I don't, at the moment -- and I'm just trying to be as transparent as possible, think he took these 1500 documents because he had pride of authorship and an interest in the forms that he developed and it just happened to get the confidential rating information.

MR. BROOKS: I understand, your Honor, and I didn't intend to go there because I don't want him up there. I was trying to answer the question you posed, but I understand we'll -- we'll rely on the record and I understand where your Honor comes down on this.

But so, again, rather than focus on that, focusing on what Boston Private's papers say, they admit that this process -- this is an open bidding process. These clients, in other words, say, "Hey, here's what this bank is offering you. Can you beat it? Can you match it?" So I understand there's a skepticism, "Well, why did you have those documents?" But their own papers demonstrate that the documents that they claim to be interested in had no impact on the alleged harm that they claim befell them, your Honor.

So even if you were to find that, um, what Mr. Rassiger -- ultimately what Mr. Rassiger downloaded,

based on their papers, constituted trade secrets, I
don't think they can meet the burden of showing
likelihood of success on the merits because they haven't
established that they were harmed by that. And, in
fact, their own papers seemed to belie that conclusion
because they say this First Republic Bank came in and
started offering these crazy low interest rates.

THE COURT: Well, one of the things that occurred to me as I was reading this is I think the papers say that Mr. Rassiger worked with what 25 private

MR. BROOKS: Yeah, in the neighborhood, yes.

THE COURT: And so why were these two targeted by him? I mean, frequently intent, causation, at a preliminary stage -- well, intent or state of mind frequently has to be proven by circumstantial evidence and here we're on a motion for preliminary injunction, neither of you have given me an affidavit from A or B saying it's exactly the way Mr. Rassiger said or it's different. I'd have to decide based on the record and, you know, eventually have a trial, if a trial is necessary, and there would be a fuller record and the facts might come out differently. But, you know, why these two and not the other 23?

MR. BROOKS: Are you asking me?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BROOKS: Well, if anything, your Honor, I would think the fact that he has only made -- he has only made it two is to support Mr. Rassiger's thinking that this wasn't a -- I mean, typically in these cases what you see is somebody goes out and just starts -- I can tell you -- I can try to provide an answer, but I think it might just lead your Honor -- it's back to the declaration and I know you don't want to get into that.

THE COURT: No, you can go back to the declaration.

MR. BROOKS: Well, I think, in terms to

Customer A there was an initial, um -- at least the

first contact between Mr. Rassiger and Customer A was

Customer A reaching out to Mr. Rassiger, which then led

to a conversation about interest rates. As I understand

it, with Customer B, that was a customer already known

to First Republic. And so that's how those two came

into being. So that's why it's two of the 25.

And I think that's an important point. If you really had the keys to the kingdom, wouldn't this have been Customers A through Y, if there were 25, and that's not what happened.

THE COURT: At this point there hasn't been any discovery and I don't know whether, you know, C, D,

and E were contacted or just didn't mature into something that the plaintiff knows about.

MR. BROOKS: But I think that's right, they would certainly know about them if they lost the business. And there's no -- Mr. Rassiger is not subject to a non-compete or a nonsolicitation, so he's allowed to reach out to these people. And again if these documents really were as important as Boston Private make them out to be, he could steal all of their clients and it would be that simple. But that's not the way it works. Frankly it comes down to -- and I think their own papers support this, "Who's going to give me the best interest rate and I'm going to use banks against each other. I'm going to tell this bank, 'Hey they're giving me this, here's the term sheet, beat it'."

So ultimately, your Honor, I think that while there's no argument that Mr. Rassiger took documents, there will likely be a dispute about whether or not they constitute trade secrets or they're confidential, respectfully I don't think plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that they have been harmed by his use of this -- of these documents. And they've done a review -- and I think had they -- I understand this is an early stage, but they've done a big investigation, your Honor, and their own papers not only don't they

support the contention that they've been unharmed, they actually undercut it by explaining how the bid process works.

THE COURT: Okay. And does First Republic want to be heard, because you're not a direct party, but you would be impacted by the injunction?

MR. GURYAN: Yes, I'd like to be heard.

With respect to Katherine deWilde, it's clear in at least her affidavit that she has the authority or had the authority to separate, not Mr. Rassiger. That when Customer A and Customer B approached them, um, she decided to do a below-market offer to get the business.

This would be analogous to me having a mortgage and going into another bank and saying, "Here's my mortgage, here are my terms, can you do better?" Would the bank that issued the mortgage have a right to sue me for revealing the terms? Of course not. That's absurd.

THE COURT: Well, hold on just a second.

Where in her affidavit does she say that both A and B initiated the contact?

MR. GURYAN: No, what I said is in her affidavit -- in Mr. Rassiger's declaration it's stated that A initiated the contact after he left.

THE COURT: Right, but that's -- when you -- what you said -- well, no, actually let me tell you what

you just said to me. I can read it here on my computer. That's why I asked the question. Sorry it offended you.

You said: "With respect to Katherine deWilde, it's clear in at least her affidavit that she has the authority, not Mr. Rassiger, and that when Customer A and Customer B approached them, she decided." So I thought you were telling me something different than what I understood. But you don't take the position that both A and B initiated the approaches?

MR. GURYAN: I think we get that from

Mr. Rassiger's declaration and I think that Katherine

deWilde says that she was presented with the terms from

A and B and was asked could she do better and could she

meet it? And one customer said they were going to go to

a private market and she decided to meet that. And

Boston Private apparently met that and they got the

information the same way, by asking the customer what

the rate was, and met it and kept the client. Customer

A, on the other hand, they were able to -- First

Republic was able to give a lower rate and got the

business.

This is what's called competition. To me it's not -- it's exactly what you would expect.

THE COURT: It's exactly what you would expect

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if Mr. Rassiger hadn't stole trade secrets. Competition
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     is good, unfair competition's unlawful, and that's
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     what's got to get sorted out.
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                MR. GURYAN: The other point I wanted to make,
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     though, is at this stage, for such an extraordinary
     remedy, is it should be based on facts and there is no
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     -- it's speculation that she -- that that had any
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     influence on her decision. As a matter of fact she says
     it didn't --
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                THE COURT: And where is she?
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                MR. GURYAN: Where is --
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                THE COURT: Yeah, Ms. DeWilde.
                MR. GURYAN: She's in California.
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                THE COURT: You could have brought her. Here,
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     inferences have to be drawn from circumstantial
     evidence. I've just spent several hours instructing on
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     this last week in Mr. DiMasi's case.
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           Help me with this. And it's preliminary. I have
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     to make preliminary determinations as Mr. Rassiger is
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     not going to testify. It's my present view that his
     testimony -- that his affidavit is not credible. That
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     he -- as his discussions with First Republic were
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     evolving and maturing into an offer he systematically
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     took what he knew were trade secrets in violation of the
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     IT policy and the code of conduct policy of his
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employer. And I sit here with a kind of common-sense question, "Why would somebody knowingly steal trade secrets if he didn't intend to use them?" "Why would he steal them if they didn't have value in the industry as he knows the industry much better than I know the industry?" What's the answer?

MR. GURYAN: The answer is that there's no evidence that the bank relied on them and it's -- and to make that leap is speculative. My point is that an injunction is not necessary because for the last three or more weeks the parties have been working diligently to transfer whatever information. The reason that the bank proposal didn't come up yet is, one, we weren't a party until recently, and, two, we hadn't gotten to that.

THE COURT: And I'm not deciding about the proposal.

MR. GURYAN: All I'm saying, your Honor, is let us continue to discuss this. We don't need an injunction. We're trying very hard to do it.

THE COURT: I'm awfully busy and I frankly hoped, if not thought that we wouldn't be here today. But, you know, you have had an unusual amount of time, because of my unavailability, to try to work this out and you haven't done it yet.

MR. GURYAN: Well, with respect to the visits to the home, um, Mr. Glovsky said that that wasn't satisfactory, but we have made offer after offer that deals with personal information and they stopped the discussion.

THE COURT: And I'm not going to resolve that today. If I issue an injunction, you know, it will be focused, but how -- you know, the discovery issues will be handled in a more deliberate way.

MR. GURYAN: The last point I would make is that most of the points in the injunction other than what I told you I objected to with its broadness is not only covered by a litigation hold issue, "shall not destroy," "shall not delete," um, but it's -- we have put fences around information pursuant to that. So we've already done those things and an injunction is not necessary.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Glovsky?

MR. GLOVSKY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: One of the issues that's come into sharper focus and it was already in focus somewhat for me is, you know, what's -- how has this caused harm?

What's the evidence of use? But you can address things more generally.

MR. GLOVSKY: Your Honor, with regard to

Customers A and B, I think Ms. DeWilde says all the Court needs to know. She says, in the second paragraph of her affidavit, that she got information about the two schools from Mr. Rassiger. So so much for customers or clients A and B.

There are also much bigger issues here at stake, much bigger. It's not just Customers A and B, it's not even the 25 customers that Mr. Rassiger serviced when he worked at Boston Private Bank. It is the entire portfolio of the commercial lending division of Boston Private Bank. Mr. Brown's second affidavit explains to the Court that he isolated that document, sent it to one of his two home e-mails, and still retains that document today.

The issues in this case and the harm to the bank and to its customers and God knows how many people out there who he has information about, institutions and individuals, that's what we're talking about. We're not talking about just A and B. Although I think we've shown, I think Ms. DeWilde has shown that, with regard to A and B, the information came from Mr. Rassiger. But beyond clients A and B, there's C through Z and so on and so forth, and all these individuals's information, he stole.

So, you know, insofar as irreparable harm is

concerned, and not to mention the public interest, I think it's overwhelming here, your Honor. We have someone who downloaded nine times, consciously downloaded nine times, in voluminous information, much of which was trade secret information. That's conduct which this court should not countenance for one second.

We also have a situation, your Honor, and I failed to mention this earlier, but -- and we have an affidavit that the Court would like to have to the effect that not only did Mr. Rassiger take this information, but while he was taking it he systematically categorized it by client of Boston Private Bank. He created folders in his computer for each of those entities. This was a conscious defalcation and theft and an effort by Mr. Rassiger to not just, you know, compromise Boston Private Bank but to enhance his relationship with his new employer. First Republic is, I think, alone by Ms. DeWilde's affidavit, is a party to that and either its conduct nor his ought to be countenanced.

THE COURT: All right. Well, it's always my goal to decide these matters orally, not casually, but orally. I've studied the submissions. The arguments have been helpful, but they haven't altered my tentative view, although they will help me refine the scope of the injunction. But the motion for a preliminary injunction

is hereby allowed.

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By way of background, since the transcript will be the detailed findings required, I'll say that on May 16, 2011, the plaintiff, Boston Private Bank & Trust Company filed a complaint against defendant Todd Rassiger, the former Senior Vice-President at Boston Private who is now employed at First Republic Bank, a competitor of Boston Private, in the commercial loan market.

On June 3rd, 2011, Boston Private filed an amended complaint adding First Republic as a defendant. amended complaint alleges Rassiger's violation of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the CFAA, and also contains eight state law claims against Rassiger, particularly misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, breach of contract, breach of implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with actual and/or prospective economic advantage, and conversion. The only claim against First Republic is for conversion. And yesterday on June 21, a motion for a preliminary injunction directly against First Republic was filed. It has not yet been fully briefed.

The standard for obtaining a motion for a

preliminary injunction is familiar but important. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The Court is required to weigh four factors. The first is whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The second is whether the plaintiff has established an imminent threat of irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. The Court is also required to balance the hardship to the plaintiff if no injunction is issued against the hardship to the defendants if the requested injunction is ordered. In addition, the Court must consider the effect of the proposed injunction on the public interest.

The First Circuit has stated, on a number of occasions, that the likelihood of success on the merits is of primary importance, it is the sine qua non for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. If a great showing of likely success on the merits is made by a plaintiff, a reduced showing of irreparable harm may be appropriate, as the First Circuit has said in cases such as Ross-Simons, 102 F. 3rd at 19 and Astra, 94 F. 3rd at 743. In addition, a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy, it does not issue automatically, even if the foregoing criteria indicate that an injunction is warranted.

While the parties haven't addressed it, there's

also the requirement for a bond if an injunction issues and I'll discuss that requirement after I explain my ruling.

I find that the plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of at least its misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty claims, two of the three briefed in connection with the motion for a preliminary injunction. I also find that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim, but I'm not relying on that because I think there are some complicated legal issues there.

With regard to misappropriation of trade secrets, to establish a common law claim for misappropriation of a trade secret the plaintiff must prove that, one, the matter in question is a trade secret. Two, it took reasonable steps to preserve the matter's confidentiality. And three, the defendant utilized improper means or participated in his own or another's breach of a confidential relationship to acquire and use the trade secret. I wrote that in *Picker International*, 931 F. Supp. 18 at 35, summarizing the relevant Massachusetts case law.

The statutory codification in Mass. General Law Chapter 93, Section 42, of the tort of misappropriation

of trade secrets, "does not appear to alter the common law prima facie elements for the tort," as Judge Skinner wrote in *Data General*, 795 F. Supp. 501 at 507. There are generally six factors to consider to determine whether something is a trade secret. These are described in *Jet Spray*, 361 Mass. 845 at 840. I also discuss them in *Picker*. They're the Restatement of Torts Section 757, Comment B, factors. The key factor in this case is whether Boston Private took adequate measures to protect what it characterizes as a trade secret. And I predict, based on what I know, that it will establish all of the criteria for a trade secret including that requirement.

Mr. Rassiger worked for Boston Private Bank in connection with its nonprofit clients. His computer use was governed by Boston Private's "IT Acceptable Use Policy" and its conduct code. The IT policy provides that: "All messages, files and attachments that are created, composed, sent or received on the computer equipment, electronic mail, or Internet systems, are and remain the property of the bank." The IT policy also provides that confidential files and NonPublic Personal Information, NPPI, must never be stored on portable media devices such as USB flash drives. Mr. Rassiger electronically acknowledged receipt of the IT policy on

May 18th of 2010.

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As a Boston Private employee Rassiger was also subject to Boston Private's code of business conduct and ethics, the "Conduct Code." The Conduct Code provides that all employees must act in the best interests of the company and avoid situations that present a potential or actual conflict between their personal interests and the company's interests. The code also prohibits employees from using Boston Private property or information for personal gain, from disclosing confidential information, and the Conduct Code provides that upon leaving the company employees must return to the company all confidential and/or proprietary information of the company in their possession. For purposes of the Conduct Code, "confidential information" includes all nonpublic information that might be of use to competitors or harmful to the company or its customers if disclosed. Rassiger electronically acknowledged receipt of the Conduct Code on May 18th, 2010.

Rassiger was speaking to First Republic in

November of 2010 about possible employment with First

Republic. He may have received a job offer informally
as early as November 15th, 2010.

Starting by November 9th, 2010, Rassiger downloaded files from Boston Private Bank servers on at

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least six dates and maybe nine times, or it appears, it's argued nine times on those six dates, between November 9th, 2010 and November 14th, 2010. Rassiger, between those dates, downloaded files from Boston Private's server to a personal USB drive. At least two such downloads occurred after Rassiger received First Republic's offer letter, formal offer letter on December 10th, 2010. Boston Private has also discovered that Rassiger e-mailed various Boston Private documents to his personal e-mail accounts. These documents and files include the terms, conditions, structure and maturity dates of particular bonds, loans or mortgages as well as templates for such agreements, client-specific term sheets, customer correspondence including commitment letters, internal Boston Private guidelines for pricing a tax-exempt bond and the financial model underlying that pricing, spreadsheets containing lists, confidential information and other client details for existing and prospective customers for both the bank's commercial lending division as well as its deposit and cash-management division, board presentations made by others including those outside the commercial lending division, strategy documents such as strategic plans developed in consultation with outside consultants to whom the bank paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, and

detailed proprietary human resources leadership and commercial lending documents.

In total it appears that Rassiger copied over 1500 documents including hundreds of confidential files.

Among these files are documents relating to the customers, now characterized as private schools, and in the papers referred to as "A" and "B," including their credit applications, term sheets, balance sheets, and loan agreements. One of the files that Rassiger evidently sent to his personal e-mail account is a document identifying Customer A as a target to pursue. Another is a document listing Boston Private's entire commercial loan portfolio for 2010.

Rassiger claims that, quote: "For the most part, these company documents were unquestionably nonconfidential and did not reflect protected trade secrets or similarly classified information," end quote. He describes the bulk of the documents as "personal documents," including "e-mails from my wife, letters to my young children, correspondence with my accountant, my tax returns, and information about my taxes, information about my personal community involvement, and our family Christmas card list."

However, in his declaration he states: "When I was compiling that personal information I copied certain

other documents that I had worked on or used at Boston
Private generally with the vague notion that such
documents might be useful solely as forms at some
undefined future time and place and/or because I was
proud of my efforts on the documents in question and
wanted to make sure I had them as some kind of
keepsakes." He states: "While I do not dispute Boston
Private's contention that I acknowledged a policy
regarding attachment of USB flash drives to my computer,
I was not conscious or deliberately attempting to
violate that or any other Boston Private policy when I
reviewed and copied the documents at issue."

Rassiger contends that the files he downloaded and e-mailed to himself were not trade secrets and were instead, quote, "concerned generic information regarding loans, including terms, conditioned structure and maturity dates, term sheets, correspondence, guidelines, board presentations, and training documents." Rassiger also contends that Boston Private made insufficient efforts to keep these files secret and that he was not subject to any nondisclosure or noncompete or nonsolicitation agreements.

But first I find that some of what Mr. Rassiger characterizes as "generic" are trade secrets, um, but -- and I note these only to be representative. The files

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Rassiger downloaded and e-mailed to himself appear to have been neither generic nor public.

For example, on December 8th, 2010, two days before receiving an offer from First Republic, Rassiger e-mailed himself a credit application for a \$27.5 million bond submitted by a prospective Boston Private customer, according to Brown's supplemental declaration, Paragraph 6. This application has been reviewed by a Boston Private -- I'm sorry. This application had been reviewed by a Boston Private credit analyst and contained a proprietary risk benefit assessment and an evaluation of Boston Private's strategic relationship with the prospective customer. In addition, on January 24th, 2011, only weeks before resigning from Boston Private, Rassiger e-mailed himself a file listing Boston Private's entire commercial loan portfolio, including customer names and risk ratings. And Rassiger also copied onto a USB drive credit applications submitted by Customers A and B. The copying of the entire commercial loan portfolio, among other things, makes to me Mr. Rassiger's contention that he wanted keepsakes of his work product unconvincing.

As I noted earlier -- well, before we get to that.

Moreover, on the present record, I find that

Boston Private took care to ensure the confidentiality of the files I've just referenced and similar files.

Boston Private protects its computers and e-mail servers with passwords and controls remote access to its servers by requiring employees to apply for a remote authorization password and token capable of generating an authentification code. In addition, Boston Private utilizes a three-tiered document classification system in which documents are categorized as "public," "internal," or "restricted," depending on the sensitivity of the document's contents.

Per regulations posted on Boston Private's

Internet, employee access to internal and restricted

documents is limited and employees are prohibited from

storing any internal or restricted documents on their

computers or mobile devices. In addition, employees are

only permitted to e-mail restricted documents via an

encrypted e-mail service and Boston Private maintains

its client records on a password-protected platform,

employee access to which is reviewed on a quarterly

basis. Boston Private represents that many of the files

Rassiger downloaded or e-mailed to himself are

classified as "restricted" and contained nonpublic

personal information such as customer names paired with

a loan or an account number. There's nothing that

refutes this contention.

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In addition, Rassiger, as I said earlier, was subject to the Boston Private IT policy and conduct code which when observed provide protection for confidential information. As I noted earlier, I believe the IT policy provides that all messages, files and attachments that are created, composed, sent or received on the computer equipment, electronic mail, or Internet systems, are and remain the property of the bank and the conduct code prohibits employees from disclosing confidential information and provides that upon leaving the company the employees must return to the company all confidential and/or proprietary information of the company in their possession. Mr. Rassiger didn't do this. Basically I find that many of the files that Mr. Rassiger took from Boston Private were trade secrets.

At this hearing, counsel for Mr. Rassiger and for the First Republic Bank argued that he did not use any of the trade secrets that he took or may have taken, in their view. At the moment I don't find that it's likely that that will be proven at trial. There's basically no reason to steal trade secrets, including the entire commercial loan file of Boston Private, if somebody experienced in the industry like Mr. Rassiger doesn't

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feel it has commercial value and intends to use it. I said, based on what's been presented to me, it doesn't seem likely it would be found that he took these files as mementos of his fine work for Boston Private. took them because he thought they were valuable and it would help his new employer. And it's necessary at this point, where there's not been any discovery, to rely particularly perhaps on circumstantial evidence, but I infer that being knowledgeable enough in the industry to have been recruited by First Republic, Mr. Rassiger knew what was useful and he took it because he intended to use it and that contributes to my conclusion that he did. But there's also direct evidence. The declaration of August-deWilde, submitted by the defendants, says that First Republic learned of interest rates that Customers A and B were paying from both Mr. Rassiger and the clients.

The facts I've just recited also indicate that the plaintiff is reasonably likely to prevail on the breach of fiduciary duty claims. Basically to establish a breach of fiduciary duty: "A plaintiff must prove the existence of a fiduciary duty, a breach of that duty, causation and damages," as the Mass Appeals Court said in *Hanover Insurance*, 46 Mass Appeals Court 153 at 164.

The existence of a fiduciary duty of loyalty is

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presumed for management-level employees like Mr. Rassiger. As the Supreme Judicial Court said in Chelsea Industries, 389 Mass 1 at 11: "Employees occupying a position of trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to their employer, they must protect the interests of the employer." As the SJC said in Augat, 409 Mass 165 at 172 to 173, an employee may prepare to compete with his employer while still employed provided that in the course of such preparations he or she does not otherwise act in violation of their fiduciary duty. As the SJC put it: "An at-will employee may properly plan to go into competition with his employer and may take active steps to do so while he is so employed. There are, however, certain limitations on the conduct of an employee who plans to compete with his employer, he may not appropriate his employer's trade secrets, he may not solicit his employer's customers while still working for his employer, and he may not carry away certain information such as lists of customers." That's Augat, 409 Mass 165 at 172 and 173, reiterating the Restatement III of Agency, Section 8.03. Here I find that the plaintiff is likely to prove

Here I find that the plaintiff is likely to prove that Rassiger misappropriated trade secrets of Boston Bank and used them to solicit Customers A and B, and discovery will show whether, as may be the case, that

confidential information and trade secrets were used more widely.

As I said earlier, I am not relying, in this analysis, on the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Claim. The breach of fiduciary duty, if proven, may well be enough to establish the CFFA claim on the prong of exceeding authority, if the First Circuit's decision in *EF-Cultural*, 274 F. 3rd at 581 to 582, predicts the First Circuit's view on how the statute ought to be interpreted, which is relatively broadly. But it's not essential to rely on the statute for the purposes of deciding whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate. Since the plaintiff has made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits, a reduced showing of the threat of irreparable harm is permissible and I find, in this case, appropriate.

In this case, Mr. Rassiger, it appears on the present record, has misappropriated trade secrets. I find that there would be no adequate remedy at law for the use of those trade secrets, and subtle ways in which the trade secrets could be used may be difficult to discern and demonstrate. But more particularly for these purposes, the argument today indicates how hard it might be to value the lost business or particularly the loss of goodwill or the general head start that the

trade secrets could give First Republic, which is trying to enter this new market.

With regard to the balance of hardships, it heavily favors the plaintiff. As I said, it could be -- it would be, I predict, irreparably harmed if its trade secrets were used by a competitor. There is no unfair hardship to Mr. Rassiger or First Republic. The order I'll issue will be shaped to remove any unfair advantage they have and require them to compete without the benefit of Private Bank's confidential information, which is the way they should have been competing from Day 1.

I find the public interest is also served by the issuance of the injunction. Free and fair competition is a very good thing, but people invest in developing confidential information and trade secrets, the law prohibits the misappropriation of them, and it's in the public interest to enforce the law.

Now, the parties didn't -- so I am going to issue a written preliminary injunction. It will essentially require the maintenance of the records that apparently -- well, that I found, for present purposes, have been misappropriated and prohibit their use by Mr. Rassiger or anyone working in concert with him, including First Republic. There are some discovery issues and the

discovery issues I will refer to Magistrate Judge Boal who will hear you on them, if you can't resolve them, and you have made some progress, so perhaps you can resolve them.

Under Rule 65(c), an injunction shouldn't issue unless a bond in an appropriate amount is issued. At the moment -- in case it turns out that a party has been wrongfully restrained. At the moment I don't have any evidence as to what the amount of the bond should be and I may peg it at \$25,000 or something like that, unless somebody would like to be heard on the issue.

MR. GLOVSKY: Well, as I recall the rule, your Honor, it allows for a waiver of the bond and I think that might be appropriate in this instance.

THE COURT: I think you recall the rule from when you worked in the Department of Justice. It's only the United States that's exempt from the bond requirement.

All right. Well, I'm going to impose a \$25,000 bond.

I don't know whether I'm going to schedule the rest of this case, discovery, right now or not, but I think I will see the lawyers in the lobby. When I do schedule discovery, whether it's now or no later than early August, I don't anticipate allowing a long period

for discovery. I think it's important to all the parties that this get resolved, if you can't resolve it by agreement and it has to be litigated. So I'm thinking a couple of months, not a couple of years. mean, there's a sharp focus to this and if Mr. Rassiger and his new employer have, as it appears to me now, trade secrets, they should be returned and any damages should be determined. On the other hand, if this necessarily preliminary review on the limited record doesn't predict the ultimate outcome, Mr. Rassiger and First Republic ought to be able to get on with it without the possibility chilling effect of this litigation.

So it's 5 minutes of 12:00. I'll see you in about 5 minutes in the lobby and I'll -- I will issue, of course, a written order that defines the scope of the preliminary injunction and puts everybody on clear notice, but that will be later today.

The Court is in recess. And the gentleman on the phone should stay on the phone. We'll be back to you when we get to my lobby. The Court is in recess.

And, actually, Mr. Brooks, if you want to bring Mr. Rassiger back there, you're welcome to do that.

> MR. BROOKS: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. (Ends, 12:00 p.m.)

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C E R T I F I C A T EI, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes, before Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, on Wednesday, June 22, 2011, to the best of my skill and ability. /s/ Richard H. Romanow 6-24-11 RICHARD H. ROMANOW Date